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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FAR EAST
Court House of the Tribunal
War Ministry Building
Tokyo, Japan

The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,
at 0930.

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Appearances:

For the Tribunal, same as before with the exception of HON. DELFIN JARANILLA, Justice, Member from the Commonwealth of the Philippines, who is not sitting.

For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

For the Defense Section, same as before.

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(English to Japanese and Japanese to English interpretation was made by SHIMANOUCHI, Toshiro and TSUCHIYA, Jun, Sho Onodera acting as Monitor.)

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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present
4 except OKAWA and HIRANUMA who are represented by
5 counsel.

6 Mr. Higgins.

7 MR. HIGGINS: Mr. President, Members of the
8 Tribunal, on Tuesday of this week the Court, on the
9 application of the prosecution, made an order that
10 prosecution might be permitted to examine three wit-
11 nesses from China. At the time the order was entered
12 by the Court, we of the prosecution thought that the
13 present phase of this case would be completed by
14 that time. It now appears that this phase will not
15 be completed until perhaps Tuesday. We would like
16 very much, therefore, for the Court to extend the
17 order for the examination of these witnesses until
18 the present phase of the case is completed rather
19 than break the continuity of the case.

20 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Warren.

21 MR. WARREN: If the Tribunal please, unless
22 there is some objection from individual counsel, whom
23 we were unable to contact on short notice, the de-
24 fense would have no objection. We think it would
25 make for an orderly procedure, sir.

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1 THE PRESIDENT: Yes. The Chinese witnesses
2 will be taken after the present phase is disposed of.

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4 R Y U K I C H I T A N A K A, called as a witness
5 on behalf of the prosecution, resumed the stand
6 and testified as follows:

7 MR. SACKETT: If the Court please, I would
8 like to proceed with the interrogation of this wit-
9 ness.

10 BY MR. SACKETT (Continued):

11 Q General TANAKA, at the close of the session
12 yesterday we were discussing a conversation that you
13 had with General TATEKAWA that occurred after the
14 Manchurian Incident and in which you described his
15 activities on the night of September 18, 1931. I
16 will ask you if in this conversation -- whether or
17 not he indicated to you, when he left Tokyo for
18 Mukden that he knew the Incident was going to occur
19 on the night of September 18.

20 A Yes.

21 Q Will you state what he said?

22 A He said that this Incident was being
23 planned by the Kwantung Army.

24 Q My question was whether or not TATEKAWA
25 indicated to you in his conversation with you as to

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1 whether he knew when he left Tokyo that the Incident
2 was going to occur on the night of September 18.

3 A No.

4 MR. BROOKS: If your Honor please, I think
5 these questions he is getting into now -- he should
6 ask direct questions and not leading questions. I
7 make an objection for that reason. He talks about an
8 incident without describing what it is. If he means
9 the explosion, that is one thing. The witness talked
10 yesterday all day about an incident, and he was
11 apparently having a state of restoring peace and
12 order in his mind, and this man thought nothing of
13 the explosion that occurred.

14 I ask that the counsel be instructed to ask
15 questions on direct examination that are not leading
16 and not put the words in the man's mouth.

17 THE PRESIDENT: I cannot speak for every
18 Member in the Court without consulting them, but I
19 think we all know what he means.

20 MR. SACKETT: That question does not put
21 the answer in the witness' mouth, your Honor, sir.
22 I asked him whether he said anything.

23 (To the interpreter) Will you ask him the
24 question again, please, sir? The last question I
25 asked him -- will you ask the witness?

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1 A No.

2 Q You testified yesterday, General, that
3 TATEKAWA had indicated to you that the Manchurian
4 Incident was planned in advance. Did he state to
5 you in his conversation the individuals that were
6 involved in this plan, and, if so, who were they?

7 A Yes.

8 Q Will you state their names as he told them
9 to you?

10 A He said in Japan it was the Sakura-kai
11 under the leadership of HASHIMOTO and CHO; among
12 civilians, a group headed by OKAWA advocating Man-
13 churian independence; and, in the Kwantung Army,
14 Colonel ITAGAKI and Lieutenant-Colonel ISHIHARA.
15 TATEKAWA furthermore said that he had strongly sup-
16 ported the actions of HASHIMOTO and CHO.

17 Q Did he state to you the purpose of the
18 plans among these individuals?

19 A Yes. With respect to the Kwantung Army in
20 Manchuria -- he spoke simply on the subject of Man-
21 churian independence. But, with respect to action
22 in Japan, he spoke in detail.

23 With the outbreak of the Incident in Man-
24 churia, ITAGAKI said -- TATEKAWA said the situation
25 in Japan generally will not necessarily actively

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1 support the Manchurian Incident. For example, he
2 said that the WAKATSUKI Cabinet will oppose the
3 Incident.

4 TATEKAWA further stated that HASHIMOTO, CHO
5 and OKAWA planned the October Incident in 1931 for
6 the purpose of overthrowing the government then in
7 power and to set up in its place a new government
8 which would support the Manchurian Incident, adding
9 that he would support such a new government.

10 THE MONITOR: Addition: TATEKAWA said that
11 he knew about this and would support this.

12 A (Continuing) Furthermore, when I met him at
13 the headquarters of the Imperial Rule Manhood Corps
14 in August, 1944, he referred to the Manchurian ques-
15 tion. In other words, he said that, if we do not
16 win the war in the Pacific, the State of Manchukuo,
17 which we did everything possible to set up, will be
18 broken from its foundation. Hence, it was of utmost
19 necessity that we win the war in the Pacific. To
20 win, however -- but the situation at that time
21 made victory extremely difficult.

22 He further stated that if Japan lost the
23 war the State of Manchukuo, which had been set up,
24 would disappear.

25 THE MONITOR: It is indeed regrettable if

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1 that happens.

2 Q You have mentioned Captain CHO on several
3 occasions. Do you know him?

4 A Yes.

5 Q Is he living or dead?

6 A He was killed in action in the last stage
7 of the battle on Okinawa last year.

8 Q What was his rank at the time of his death?

9 A At the time of his death he was Major
10 General, but he was promoted posthumously to
11 Lieutenant General.

12 Q Did you ever serve with or under him in
13 the army?

14 A Yes, with him.

15 Q For how long a time?

16 A In the China Section of the Army General
17 Staff for about nine months, between December, 1929
18 and August, 1930.

19 Q Did you ever talk to him prior to September
20 18, 1931 about Manchuria?

21 A May I make that correction: September,
22 1930 instead of August.

23 No.

24 Q Did you ever talk to him after September
25 18 about the Incident?

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1 A Yes.

2 Q When and where did this conversation take
3 place?

4 A Captain CHO went to Shanghai to be stationed
5 there in June, 1932. At that time I was Assistant
6 Military Attache of the Japanese Embassy in China,
7 and CHO stayed with me for one month giving us an
8 opportunity to talk with each other.

9 Q Did he have anything to say to you as to
10 whether or not the Manchurian Incident was the
11 result of a plan?

12 A Yes.

13 Q What did he say?

14 A He told me that the Manchurian Incident
15 had been planned by the Kwantung Army beforehand and
16 that he, becoming one of the central figures -- by
17 becoming one of the central figures in the Sakura-kai,
18 exerted every effort to make it known and understood
19 by the army and the people at large of the need to
20 bring about a definite and decisive settlement of
21 the Manchurian issues and problems which had become
22 extremely serious and aggravated since the killing of
23 Captain Shintaro NAKAMURA in the Wanpaoshan Incident.

24 Q Did he disclose the names of any of the
25 people involved in the plan?

1 A Yes.

2 Q What did he say?

3 A He said that in the Kwantung Army the lead-
4 ing figures were ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA. He said that
5 at home in Japan he, himself -- that is, CHO -- was
6 the leader and that HASHIMOTO had supported and
7 accepted his idea. Among the civilians it was OKAWA
8 and his group which cooperated with him -- that is,
9 CHO -- in the undertaking. He said -- that is, CHO
10 said -- that he was the virtual leader and key
11 figure in the contemplated October Incident; that he
12 had planned it. But he further said that in the
13 latter stage of the plan many of the members of the
14 Sakura-kai began to hesitate, and, therefore, he
15 tried forcibly to drag them along towards execution
16 of the plan.

17 He stated very definitely that, if it had
18 not been for him, the October Incident would not
19 have progressed to the point that it did progress.

20 As to the purpose of the Incident, CHO
21 said that it was the internal renovation of Japan
22 and the mobilization of Japan's entire national
23 strength and opinion in the settlement of the Man-
24 churian issues under a new government. CHO further
25 said that, as to the October Incident, ISHIHARA of

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1 the Kwantung Army was strongly opposed and that he --
2 CHO -- was reprimanded by ISHIHARA just after the
3 October Incident when ISHIHARA stopped over in
4 Mukden while en route to North China.

5 Just after the October Incident, CHO
6 continued to say, Japanese opinion, especially
7 opinion among the central military authorities, was
8 not in favor of Manchurian independence. He said
9 that -- CHO said -- he had let loose some rumors
10 in order to induce the central army authorities to
11 support the Kwantung Army. That is, he said the
12 Kwantung Army was intending to carry out a separation-
13 ist movement and declare its independence from Japan
14 if Japan proper would continue to oppose the Kwan-
15 tung Army.

16 As a result of this propaganda carried on
17 by CHO, the central army authorities -- the attitude
18 of the central army authorities suddenly changed and
19 began to lean toward -- in favor of the Kwantung
20 Army. But, he said laughingly, that it was a plan
21 hatched by himself and that no one in the Kwantung
22 Army had any ideas about it.
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1 Q Did he state whether or not he knew in advance
2 of September 18 that the events that actually did hap-
3 pen were going to take place that night?

4 MR. McMANUS: If your Honor please, if they
5 are going to accept the testimony of dead men, I re-
6 quest sincerely that you confine the prosecutor to
7 meticulously ask the questions properly.

8 MR. SACKETT: The prosecutor can see nothing
9 wrong with that question, your Honor.

10 THE PRESIDENT: Nor do I. As to conversa-
11 tions with dead men, we dealt with that yesterday. I
12 can add nothing to what was said then.

13 MR. SACKETT: Did you answer the question?

14 LANGUAGE SECTION CHIEF: He answered; he
15 said "no."

16 Q General TANAKA, do you know the accused
17 MINAMI?

18 A Yes.

19 Q Do you know him well or casually?

20 A I know His Excellency MINAMI well, having
21 served as his subordinate in the Kwantung Army as
22 Staff Officer from March 1935 to March 1936.

23 Q Did you ever talk to him about the Manchurian
24 Incident?

25 A I have never talked about the Manchurian

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1 Incident on my own part with His Excellency MINAMI.

2 MR. McCORMACK: If the Court please --

3 THE PRESIDENT: Let him finish his answer
4 first.

5 A (Continued) However, I think it was in the
6 fall of 1935 General MINAMI told me that about the
7 time of the Manchurian Incident he had given ex-
8 pression to a positive opinion with respect to Man-
9 churia reflecting the attitude of the entire army.
10 As a result of this expression of army opinion,
11 MINAMI had come into loggerheads with Foreign Minis-
12 ter SHIDEHARA, who maintained a passive attitude
13 resulting in friction which extended even into their
14 personal emotions.

15 MR. McCORMACK: Now, if the Court please,
16 that question wasn't answered. He gave the answer
17 and then tried to make a speech. I suggest that if
18 counsel wants a witness to answer a question that he
19 ask the question, and that this Court don't give
20 opportunities to witnesses to make speeches -- things
21 that occur to them outside of the question asked. I
22 think counsel is capable of doing that, but the wit-
23 ness does not understand.

24 THE PRESIDENT: I think the answer extended
25 to related matters, and is unobjectionable on that

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1 ground.

2 Q General, I did not understand your answer.
3 Will you state again what MINAMI said with reference
4 to SHIDEHARA?

5 A General MINAMI said that Foreign Minister
6 SHIDEHARA maintained a very passive attitude with
7 respect to the settlement of various pending issues
8 involving Manchuria. On the contrary, General MINAMI,
9 representing army opinion, advocated a decisive settle-
10 ment of the pending issues from the standpoint of
11 national defense. Because of that fact, whether
12 before the Incident or after the Incident, these two
13 men were opposed, and constant friction existed be-
14 tween them.

15 Q What was MINAMI's rank or position when you
16 served with him in the Kwantung Army?

17 A Commander-in-Chief, Kwantung Army; full
18 General.

19 Q To your personal knowledge, while you were
20 in Manchuria, did MINAMI ever exercise any control
21 or influence over Manchukuo?

22 A In accordance with the treaties entered
23 into between Japan and Manchuria, he most effectively
24 exercised the right of inter-leadership over Manchuria
25 as Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army.

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1 Q Are you acquainted with the accused, TOJO?

2 A Yes.

3 Q Do you know him well or casually?

4 A I know him well.

5 Q Did you ever serve with him or under him in
6 the army?

7 A Yes.

8 Q When and where?

9 A From March to the end of July, 1937, and
10 after August, by order of the General Staff, as Regi-
11 mental Commander in Chahar, and Chief of Staff of the
12 TOJO Army Corps; from December 1, 1940, to September,
13 1942, I served under His Excellency TOJO as Chief of
14 the Military Service Bureau, War Office.

15 Q To your knowledge, was TOJO ever attached to
16 the Kwantung Army?

17 A Yes.

18 Q What was his rank or connection?

19 A He was Lieutenant General, and in March,
20 1937, succeeded ITAGAKI as Chief of Staff, Kwantung
21 Army. If my recollection is correct, in June, 1938 --
22 up to June, 1938, he served as Chief of Staff of the
23 Kwantung Army until he became Vice Minister of War
24 under General ITAGAKI.

25 Q To your knowledge did TOJO, as Chief of Staff

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1 of the Kwantung Army, ever exercise any influence or
2 control over Manchukuo?

3 A I think, if I am not mistaken, that it was in
4 the fall of 1936, at the time ITAGAKI was Chief of
5 Staff of the Kwantung Army, that the Five-Year Develop-
6 ment Plan of Manchukuo was established. This plan
7 took effect after TOJO became Chief of Staff of the
8 Kwantung Army. At that time, that is during the time
9 TOJO was Chief of Staff, the number of bandits in
10 Manchuria decreased to a point that there were less
11 than ten thousand. Law and order were being maintained
12 very satisfactorily, and under -- in accordance with
13 TOJO's plan, the political, economic -- Manchukuo
14 made very epochal strides in the field of politics,
15 economics and national defense.

16 Q Did TOJO have anything to do with the ap-
17 pointment of government officials in Manchukuo, to
18 your knowledge?

19 A Yes.

20 Q Tell us what he had to do with it?

21 A On the basis of the right or authority of in-
22 ter-leadership over Manchukuo affairs held by the
23 Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, TOJO as the
24 highest ranking officer under the Commander-in-Chief,
25 had exercised great influence over all important

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1 personnel matters in Manchuria -- Manchukuo -- and
2 no appointments or dismissals of important personnel
3 could be made without the approval of the Chief of
4 Staff.

5 Q Did Japan, after the Manchurian Incident,
6 ever completely occupy Manchuria?

7 A Yes.

8 Q By what date was this occupation completed?

9 A In the Spring of 1934, when the occupation
10 of Jehol was completed -- 1944.

11 Q I do not think that is right. I will ask
12 the question again: By what date was the occupation
13 of Manchuria completed?

14 A I think it was in the Spring of 1944, when
15 the Tangku Truce was concluded.

16 Q You mean '44?

17 A Yes.

18 MR. McCORMACK: If the Court please, I sug-
19 gest counsel be instructed not to cross-examine his
20 own witness. If his witness does not know dates, it
21 is his own fault, and he should not put the dates in
22 his mouth.

23 MR. SACKETT: If the Court please, we have
24 a language problem here.

25 MR. McCORMACK: There is no disturbance over

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1 at the translation table.

2 THE PRESIDENT: I do not think you should
3 have put it that way, Mr. Sackett.

4 A I was mistaken. It was in the Spring of
5 1933, when the Tangku Truce was signed. That is when
6 I recall the complete occupation of Manchukuo was con-
7 cluded.

8 Q Did you ever hear of the so-called Autono-
9 mous Movement in the five provinces of North China?

10 A Yes.

11 Q Were you familiar with this Movement?

12 A Yes.

13 Q How did you happen to be familiar with it?

14 A Yes, I am familiar with the Autonomous Move-
15 ment. As Staff Officer of the Kwantung Army I came
16 to familiarize myself with this movement in the
17 following manner: In view of the fact that the staff
18 officers in charge of the second section of the General
19 Staff -- of the Staff Office -- was busy, I helped
20 him in his work. After this officer-in-charge went
21 to North China, in company with General DOHIHARA --
22 that is, went to Peking with General DOHIHARA in
23 September, 1935, I took over this work and handled
24 all telegraphic messages and official papers relative
25 to this matter, the Autonomous Movement.

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1 THE MONITOR: Correction: He said
2 September, 1945.

3 A (Continuing) Accordingly, I am very well
4 versed in the Autonomous Movement in North China.
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1 Q Will you state, if you know, what provinces
2 in North China were involved?

3 A As far as the Kwantung Army was concerned,
4 the intention was to create a regime in Inner Mongolia
5 and another in North China and all the provinces re-
6 lated with the Autonomous Movement were Hopeh,
7 Shantung, Shansi, Chahar and Suiyuan.

8 THE MONITOR: These five provinces.

9 Q Will you state in detail, in your own words
10 in detail, what this movement was?

11 A The Autonomous Movement in North China began
12 in April, 1935. There were -- the purpose was two-
13 fold. One was to create an autonomous regime in
14 Mongolia; the second was to create another autonomous
15 regime in North China outside of the Mongolian area.
16 The purpose of establishing the Inner Mongolian autono-
17 mous regime was from the passive point of view to stem
18 the infiltration of Outer Mongolian influence which
19 was under Soviet control, whereas the positive purpose
20 was to set up in Inner Mongolia an independent state.
21 The purpose of creating an autonomous regime in North
22 China from the five North China provinces was as
23 follows: In other words, the objective was to separate
24 the five northern provinces from the Nanking regime
25 which stubbornly sought to restore -- to recover the

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1 lost territory, to set up from these five provinces
2 an autonomous area and to bring this area into close
3 relationship with Manchuria under Japanese leadership
4 and by establishing a close relationship among Japan
5 and Manchuria, Manchukuo and the autonomous area in
6 China, to remove the threat to Manchukuo.

7 This particular area in North China was con-
8 sidered important, being adjacent to Manchuria in its
9 southwestern direction. Addition: to place China
10 southwest of Manchukuo under Japanese leadership and
11 control.

12 THE MONITOR: Place China, which was in the
13 southwest of Manchukuo, under Japanese leadership.

14 A (Continuing) Another positive purpose for
15 the setting up of the autonomous area was to reduce the
16 power and influence of the Nanking regime which was
17 stubbornly pursuing the policy of resisting Japan.

18 THE MONITOR: And thus remove the threat in
19 Manchuria.

20 A (Continuing) This Autonomous Movement, as I
21 said before, began in April, 1945. Then this Movement
22 gained great headway from June, 1945, after the con-
23 clusion of the UMEZU-Ho Ying-chin agreement. This
24 Autonomous Movement was furthered by the Kwantung Army
25 and by the Japanese Army stationed in North China.

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1 The Army stationed in North China was in charge
2 principally of the five provinces outside of the
3 Inner Mongolian area; whereas, the Inner Mongolian
4 area was under the charge of the Kwantung Army and
5 through their leadership this Movement was pressed
6 forward. In September, 1934, Major General DOHIHARA
7 at the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwan-
8 tung Army MINAMI was attached to General Sung Che-yuan,
9 leader of the Peiping-Tientsin area in accordance with
10 the UMEZU-Ho agreement.

11 LANGUAGE SECTION CHIEF: Correction:

12 "September, 1934, should read September, 1935."

13 A (Continuing) Immediately after his arrival
14 in Peiping, Major General DOHIHARA came under the com-
15 mand of Lieutenant General TADA of the Japanese Army
16 stationed in North China. Major General DOHIHARA
17 bent his efforts toward the -- exerted his efforts on
18 behalf of the Autonomous Movement with the intentions
19 of the Kwantung Army and the Japanese Army in North
20 China in mind.

21 DR. KIYOSE: It appears as if "NISHIHARA"
22 is being interpreted "DOHIHARA".

23 THE PRESIDENT: That correction is noted.

24 LANGUAGE SECTION CHIEF: According to our
25 Japanese shorthand record the witness has been saying

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1 "DOHIHARA" and we have been repeating the term
2 "DOHIHARA".

3 MR. SACKETT: May I ask a question to
4 straighten it out, your Honor?

5 Q General TANAKA, are you referring to
6 "DOHIHARA" or "NISHIHARA" in your testimony at the
7 moment?

8 A DOHIHARA. If my memory serves me right,
9 Major General DOHIHARA at first hoped, when he
10 arrived in Peiping, to prevail upon Wu-peifu to
11 become the central figure in the North China Autono-
12 mous Movement; that is, to carry on the Autonomous
13 Movement in North China with Wu-peifu as the central
14 figure. However, this plan to set up Wu-peifu failed
15 because General Yen Hsi-shang of Shansi and General
16 Han Fu-chu of Shantung would not agree to join.
17 Later, shortly afterwards, however, as a result of the
18 great efforts made by Major General DOHIHARA, two
19 regimes were established in North China in November,
20 1935: namely, Hopeh and Chahar. One of the regimes
21 was the East Hopeh Anti-Communist Autonomous Regime
22 which covered a demilitarized zone south of the Great
23 Wall and included Tong-cho -- Yen-chin, Tong-cho,
24 Lu-tai and Chahar.

25 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess now for

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1 fifteen minutes.

2 (Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was
3 taken until 1100, after which the proceedings
4 were resumed as follows:)

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1 Q General TANAKA, will you continue with your
2 statement as to the Autonomous Movement please, sir?

3 A One regime was created in the demilitarized
4 zone south of the Great Wall north and east of a line
5 connecting three roads, namely, Yenching, Tongchu and
6 Luntai, which covered a part of Chahar, covering part
7 of East Hopei, and this regime was called the East
8 Hopei Anti-Communist Autonomous Regime and was set up
9 with Yin Ju-keng as the central figure. This regime
10 was completely separated from the Nanking Government.

11 The other regime included areas outside of
12 East Hopei and Chahar, outside of Mongolia. This
13 regime was called the Hopei-Chahar Regime. The leader
14 of the Hopei-Chahar Regime was General Sung Cheh Yuan.
15 This regime, the Hopei-Chahar Regime, was not completely
16 separated from the Nanking Government, but stood
17 for close collaboration with Japan. Japanese mili-
18 tary and economic advisers were assigned to these
19 two regimes, especially the East Hopei Regime.

20 The Hopei-Chahar Regime was under the charge
21 of the Japanese Army stationed in North China, where-
22 as the East Hopei Regime was under the charge of the
23 Kwantung Army. However, the East Hopei Regime
24 changed over into the hands of the North China Army
25 in March, 1936. These two regimes continued up to

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1 the outbreak of the North China Incident in July,
2 1937.

3 The Inner Mongolian Regime which was es-
4 tablished at Suiyuan was at first under the leader-
5 ship of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Council, es-
6 tablished at Failingmiao. This Autonomous Council in
7 Inner Mongolia, in other words, was created after a
8 strong autonomous movement carried out by the Mon-
9 golian races after the independence of Manchuria, and
10 was under the leadership of Teh-hua; however, the
11 leader in Suiyuan, General Putsuo-yi, did not favor
12 the establishment of this Autonomous Council in Inner
13 Mongolia and did not support any efforts to put
14 pressure to bear upon it.

15 MR. WARREN: If the Tribunal please, we wish
16 to object to this long dissertation of this witness as
17 not being responsive to the question.

18 MR. McMANUS: If the Court please, I would
19 like to know whether or not this man is testifying
20 from his own personal knowledge or whether he is giving
21 us facts from history.

22 THE PRESIDENT: In reply to your question,
23 Mr. McManus, it is obviously hearsay. He is giving
24 us history, but it is admissible nevertheless. Now,
25 as to confining the answers to the questions, we have

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1 no right really to reject anything that is relevant,
2 and it is most difficult to say in a flash what is
3 relevant and what is not here. The issues here are
4 vast, multitudinous, involved and inter-related and
5 we have to allow for that. All that we can insist
6 upon as far as we can judge in most cases is that the
7 evidence will be adduced in something like logical
8 sequence, and I cannot say that up to now that con-
9 sideration is being disregarded. You may take more
10 control of your witness if you think fit, Mr. Sack-
11 ett, but I cannot say, at all events, that anything he
12 said is not relevant.

13 MR. SACKETT: I think it is relevant.

14 Q General DOHIMATA, state, if you know, who
15 originated the plan of autonomous movement in the
16 first instance.

17 THE PRESIDENT: General TANAKA, is it not?

18 MR. SACKETT: General TANAKA; I am sorry.
19 I was thinking of another question.

20 A Yes.

21 Q Will you state, if you know, who
22 originated the autonomous movement in the first
23 instance?

24 A The Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung
25 Army, General MINAMI, and the commander of the Japanese

1 forces stationed in North China, Lieutenant General
2 UMEZU. Lieutenant General UMEZU returned to Japan
3 in July, 1935, and was succeeded by Lieutenant General
4 TADA.

5 Q You have mentioned DOHIMARA. Is he one
6 of the accused in this case?

7 A Yes.

8 Q You have stated that DOHIMARA was at Pei-
9 ping. Do you know why he was there?

10 A He was sent to Peking on the order of General
11 MINAMI, Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army.

12 Q What, if any, instructions was he given, if
13 you know?

14 A I had seen its contents, but I do not re-
15 member them to the extent of being able to repeat
16 them word by word here.

17 Q Will you state to the best of your recollec-
18 tion what the content was?

19 A I remember two points; first, to set up an
20 autonomous regime in North China that would maintain
21 close relationship with Manchuria, Manchukuo and
22 Japan. Two, that it had as its motto anti-communism.

23 Q In your testimony here this morning you
24 stated that the Autonomous Movement began in the
25 year 1945. Will you please state to the Tribunal

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1 what year of Showa the Movement began?

2 A The tenth year of Showa, 1935.

3 Q When did the Showa era commence by the
4 Gregorian Calendar?

5 A 1935.

6 Q General, do you know General UMEZU?

7 A Yes.

8 Q Is he one of the accused in this case?

9 A Yes.

10 Q To your personal knowledge, did he have any-
11 thing to do with this Autonomous Movement?

12 A In general, General UMEZU let matters con-
13 cerning the Autonomous Movement in the hands of his
14 Chief of Staff, Colonel SAKAI, Takashi, but it is
15 a fact that as Commander he controlled the Autonomous
16 Movement.

17 Q Will you state what, if anything, he did, to
18 your knowledge, with reference to the Autonomous Move-
19 ment himself?

20 A First, the UMEZU-Ho Yiang-chin Pact of
21 June, 1935.

22 Q What was the effect of that pact, if you
23 know?

24 A Yes.

25 Q Will you state it to the Court?

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1 A The effect of this pact was that the armies
2 of the Nanking Regime all evacuated southward and
3 North China came under the control of armies not
4 under the direct leadership of the Nanking Regime;
5 that is, the Hopei-Chahar armies under General
6 Sung Cheh-yuan.

7 MONITOR: Correction: army under the juris-
8 diction of the Nanking Regime evacuated from North
9 China to south.

10 Q Did you ever talk to the accused DOHIHARA
11 with reference to the Autonomous Movement?

12 A Yes.

13 Q When?

14 A In September, 1935, before and after General
15 DOHIHARA went to Peking.

16 Q What did he say to you with reference to
17 the Autonomous Movement?

18 A He didn't talk to me directly, but I was
19 present when he reported to Commander-in-Chief
20 MINAMI.

21 Q What did he say in your presence?

22 A That the Hopei-Chahar Regime and the East
23 Hopei Regime, though unsatisfactory, had been es-
24 tablished and would more or less obey the demands
25 of the Kwantung Army, and that the North China Regime

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1 would be established with the Hopei-Chahar Regime
2 as its core.

3 Q To your knowledge, was General DOHIHARA ever
4 an adviser to any of the autonomous governments?

5 A Yes.

6 Q When and where?

7 A According to my recollection, he served in
8 Peiping as counsellor to the Hopei-Chahar Regime from
9 the end of November, 1935, immediately after the es-
10 tablishment of this regime, to March of the following
11 year, when he became Commander of the First Division
12 in absentia.

13 Q What were his duties, if you know, as such
14 adviser?

15 A Yes.

16 Q State what they were.

17 A To control its politics and economics, in
18 accordance with Japanese hopes.

19 MONITOR: Instead of "control" - "to guide."

20 Q To your knowledge, was he successful?

21 MR. WARREN: If the Tribunal please, may
22 we have the last answer read back before this ques-
23 tion? We didn't understand it at all.

24 (Whereupon, the last answer, and cor-
25 rection by the Monitor, were read by the

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official court reporter.)

Q Will you answer the next question: was he successful, to your knowledge?

A At the time General DOHIHARA reported that as far as the Hopei-Chahar Regime was concerned, it was a success, but according to my judgment, it was half a success and half a failure.

Q Did you ever hear of the China Expeditionary Forces?

A Yes.

Q Describe what they were.

A They are the Japanese forces stationed between Peiping and Shanhaikuan, at points designated by treaty concluded by the Allies and the Peking Government of the time in 1900 after the Boxer Incident, in order to protect residents in North China and in order to protect railways and lines of communication. Its headquarters were at Tientsin.

Q What, if any, activities did this army engage in with reference to the autonomous government?

A Once more, please?

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1 Q What if any activities did this army engage
2 in with reference to the autonomous government?

3 A There were no movements of this army in order
4 to set up the autonomous regimes.

5 Q Are you acquainted with Prince Teh, ~~T~~-e-h?

6 A Yes.

7 Q Who is he?

8 A He is the ruler of the West Sunito Wang Fu,
9 in the province of Teh-hua.

10 Q Are you personally familiar with the facts
11 and circumstances surrounding the founding of the
12 Mongolian State?

13 A It was my duty as Staff Officer of the Kwan-
14 tung Army, and as Section Chief of the Research Sec-
15 tion, to bend my efforts to the fostering of the
16 Inner Mongolian autonomous regime.

17 Q Will you tell us about the founding of the
18 Mongolian State?

19 A The starting point of the Mongolian govern-
20 ment was in March, 1933, when, stimulated by the
21 independence of Manchukuo, an Inner Mongolian auton-
22 omous government was set up at Pai-ling-miao in
23 Suiyuan with the agreement of General Chiang Kai-shek.
24 But the Nanking government did not support this
25 Autonomous Council economically as it had promised

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1 and, furthermore, the Governor of Suiyuan, Pu Tsuo-yi,
2 did not welcome the establishment of this council
3 and oppressed it. This was because Prince Teh earn-
4 estly desired the re-establishment of the Mongolian
5 people, and his ideal was ultimately to establish a
6 unified Mongolian State comprising both Outer and
7 Inner Mongolia. Seeing that after the establishment
8 of Manchukuo Mongolians in Manchukuo became far more
9 prosperous, secretly began to approach the Kwantung
10 Army.

11 Together with Colonel ISHIMOTO, of the Second
12 Section of the General Staff Office, I went to see
13 Prince Teh on the orders of General MINAMI. As I
14 had been an intimate friend of Prince Teh since 1927,
15 I urged him to join hands with Japan.

16 Q What if any instructions did you receive
17 from General MINAMI when you went to see Prince Teh?

18 A The instructions were received by Colonel
19 ISHIMOTO. I did not see those instructions.

20 Q For what purpose did you go to see Prince Teh?

21 A It was in order to make the Inner Mongolian
22 Autonomous Council form close relationship with
23 Japan to establish an autonomous government in
24 Mongolia with Prince Teh as the central figure, and
25 ultimately to establish an independent government of

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1 Mongolia, since this was in line with the Kwantung
2 Army's anti-Soviet policies.

3 Q Did you carry out this mission?

4 A Yes.

5 Q State briefly what you did.

6 A First Prince Teh did not agree, but, finding
7 out the true purpose of the Kwantung Army, in August,
8 1935, he saw General MINAMI and promised close coopera-
9 tion. On this occasion the Kwantung Army promised him
10 financial assistance both then and in future.

11 THE MONITOR: Instead of promise, gave finan-
12 cial aid.

13 A In November, 1935, an agreement was reached
14 between Major General LOHIHARA and Chin Teh-chun of
15 Hopei Chahar Regime, and it was agreed that the Chahar
16 Regime would be under the control of Prince Teh. On
17 February 11, 1936, Prince Teh transferred the Inner
18 Mongolian Autonomous Council from Pai-ling-miao to his
19 own capital of West Sunito.

20 At this time some Japanese civilians, in
21 accordance with Prince Teh's desires, joined this
22 Inner Mongolian government as advisers. The duties of
23 these advisers were not to control the government as
24 in Manchuria, but to advise Prince Teh in accordance
25 with his desires.

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1 In June of that year the Inner Mongolian
2 Autonomous Council was transferred to Teh-hua, and
3 here Prince Teh secretly established an independent
4 Mongolian government. In July an agreement between
5 Manchuria and this government was concluded. This
6 treaty, concluded as between two equal parties,
7 promised that the two contracting parties would give
8 each other political and economic aid. This treaty
9 definitely was not concluded because of the demands
10 of the Kwantung Army, but because of the earnest
11 desire of Prince Teh himself. After the conclusion
12 of this treaty, Prince Teh set out equipping his
13 army. The object was to increase cavalry divisions
14 which had hitherto numbered three to nine.

15 Q I will ask you what if anything the accused
16 MINAMI had to do with the creation of this Mongolian
17 State?

18 A General MINAMI was one of the most earnest
19 proponents of the establishment of this Inner Mon-
20 golian autonomous government.

21 Q What if anything did the accused ITAGAKI
22 have to do with the creation of this Mongolian State?

23 A He was also an earnest supporter of this
24 government.

25 Q What if anything did the accused TOJO have

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1 to do with the creation of the Mongolian State?

2 A He had no connection with the establishment
3 of this government. But the Mongolian autonomous
4 government established in 1937 after the TOJO unit
5 had entered Inner Mongolia after the outbreak of the
6 China Incident was established mainly by TOJO.

7 Q To your knowledge, were any Japanese armies
8 ever trained in Manchuria?

9 A Yes.

10 Q When did this training first begin?

11 A In 1934 when Japanese troops scattered in
12 various areas in Manchuria began to assemble again.

13 Q Do you know the purpose for training armies
14 in Manchuria?

15 MR. McMANUS: If the Tribunal please, I object
16 to that question.

17 THE PRESIDENT: Well, almost anything relating
18 to the conduct of the Japanese armed forces since
19 January, 1928, is relevant. It may not be very
20 helpful in some matters.

21 MR. SACKETT: It is offered to prove --

22 THE PRESIDENT: I would like to hear the
23 evidence ascertained with less prompting. The strict
24 application, perhaps, of the rule against leading
25 questions is not desirable but prompting, undue

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1 prompting, should be avoided. For example, you could
2 have asked the witness whether any of the accused had
3 any association with Mongolia, and not mentioned
4 specific accused. That only tends to upset the defense
5 counsel, and I can well understand it.

6 Q Will you state, if you know, the purpose
7 for the training of Japanese armies in Manchuria?

8 A From the standpoint of the defense of Japan,
9 Manchuria was the base of any operations against the
10 Soviet Union. So the purpose of this training was
11 mainly for future operations against the Soviet Union.
12 Until the outbreak of the Pacific War, the army in
13 Manchuria was trained with the best weapons, the
14 best airplanes. The supposed enemy was the Soviet
15 Union. After the outbreak of the Pacific War, crack
16 units trained in Manchuria, whenever the necessity
17 arose, were sent to the southern regions.

18 Q Can you state approximately how many troops
19 were trained in Manchuria?

20 A I have no material upon which to give you
21 the exact figures. But judging from my experience
22 as Chief of the Military Service Section and Chief of
23 the Military Service Bureau, I believe it was around
24 2,500,000.

25 Q General TANAKA, are you any relation to the

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1 Premier TANAKA who was Premier of Japan in the year
2 1928?

3 A I have no connection whatsoever.

4 MR. SACKETT: Defense may cross-examine, if
5 the Tribunal please.

6 THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until
7 half-past nine on Monday morning.

8 (Whereupon, at 1155, an adjournment
9 was taken until Monday, 8 July 1946, at 0930.)

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